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Introduction 
The status of Europe and East Asia in the transition of world order can be analyzed 
under different aspects. One of the most important criteria distinguishing the different 
strategies of European and East Asian countries is the attitude towards regional 
integration versus cooperation. While Europe simultaneously tries to deepen and 
enlarge the area of integration, East Asian countries try to preserve their national 
sovereignty and focus on bilateral and multilateral models of cooperation. Rather 
than comparing the strategies applied in Eastern Asia and 
focuses on the aspects determining importance and position in the "'1I""1~1Il~ 
to find a common 
to all European countries. This common position refers to the internal 
European Union's sphere on the one hand and to international problems on the other 
hand. The capability to speak with one voice has already been very difficult in the 
pre-enlargement Europe, but today, after the accession of ten Central and Eastern 
European countries it is nearly impossible in most political areas. This conclusion 
can be drawn based upon different political, military or economic topics. This article 
states that one important point is that the integration of these Eastern countries, now 
members of the European Union, is not completed at all. This ongoing integration is 
not only an internal challenge for the former transition countries, but an obstacle for 
the European integration as a whole. The EU as a non-integrated and - according to 
most criteria very heterogeneous international actor suffers from these integration 
deficits as a whole. An ongoing integration redirects funds, fragments political and 
economic elites and introduces selection criteria that can counteract integration. 
This influences Europe's position in the world order and determines the fate of the 
integration process as well as Europe's importance in the international competition of 
regional actors. 
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Transition and Democratization 
The transition to democracy after the breakup of communist systems in Eastern 
Europe differed categorically from all changes in European history. The lack 
of a consistent transition theory and the experience with the transformation 
of communist systems, economies and societies turned the whole transition process 
into an cxperiment. Obviously, there existed a dilemma of simultaneity, which 
meant the need of a holistic reform in nearly all political, economical, societal, 
social and governmental spheres in the former communist countries. As not one of 
these countries wanted to preserve the existing socialist system, there could be 
one option for the future: opening towards the West and the political and economic 
system represented by the Western, or more precisely the West-European, countries. 
This scope of the simultaneous economic and political transformation attempted in 
Eastern Europe was unprecedented, even if dual transformations were under way in 
many parts of the Third World at the same time. "Many Asian, African, and Latin 
American states intervened extensively in their economies (short of attempting 
central planning and total control) and most of these began to move toward economic 
liberalization during the 1980s. Some are launching or seeking to consolidate political 
openings from noncommunist authoritarian political systems."l The experiences with 
transitions from authoritarian systems in Southern Europe, for example in Greece, 
and Portugal, or South America2 couldn't be used as a guideline for a successful 
ponm;al, social and economic transition leading to a democratic consolidation. So the 
transformation of communist systems and societies lacked of guiding examples and 
convincing theories, and many scientists thought it would be an impossible task. One 
and probably the best known example was an essay written by Jon Elster, entitled "The 
Necessity and Impossibili of Simultaneous Economic and Political Refornl" where 
the author came to the conclusion, that a simultaneous transfornlation in the political 
and economic sphere is impossible. 
Nevertheless, a process of de-legitimization of the communist systems and elites 
and the urge towards democracy, personal and collective freedom and free market 
economy initiated a wave of democrati7.ation in Eastern Europe. This democratization 
Nelson. J. M. 1993. The Potitics of Economic Transfonnation. Is Third World Experience Relevant in 
Eastern Europe" World Politics, 45(3), 433-463. 
O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & WhItehead L. (Eds.) 1986a. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Southern Europe. Baltimore; O'Donnell, G. & Schmitter, P. C. (Eds.) 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about uncertain Democracies. Baltimore. 
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had not only an internal dimension, but an external, too. The breakup of the 
integrating ties with the former partners in the Eastern bloc required a new integration 
strategy, namely the integration in the European Community/Union. Consequently, 
democratization in East European countries meant from an early stage of transition 
on at the same time the preparation for a European integration at some point in time. 
If integration has to bc analyzed, democratization as its grounding must be studied, 
too. Democratization in Eastern Europe can be described with the aid of a Multilevel 
Model of Democratic Consolidation as presented by Wolfgang Merkel, drawing on 
some systematic considerations developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.3 
In the first level, named the constitutional consolidation, democratic institutions, 
a system of checks and balances, an electoral system and democratic procedures 
are established in the transition country. The considered starting point is the 
constitutional foundation of the democratic system. The norms and principles laid 
down in the constitution "provide the informal patterns of behavior for social and 
political contestation, which were developed or negotiated during the transition 
process."·There are several aspects influencing and characterizing this first step of 
democratic consolidation like elites' behavior and their adherence to democratic rules 
in the susceptible transition period. Former communist elites have to comply with 
dcmocratic thinking before democracy is established, thus providing the legitimacy of 
this process and leading to the future constitutions' formal legitimacy. Several other 
aspects of legitimacy, constitution making, and theoretical or empirical perspectives 
influence the further consolidation of democracy in this context Needless to say. 
there are some theoretical issues and they vary from country to country and the 
governmental system (parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential), but in sum 
they don't affect the process of democratization itself. 
Merkel defines the representative consolidation as the second level of 
consolidation, criticizing that this aspect was neglected in almost all concepts of 
democratic consolidation. Merkel rightly introduees the level of representative 
consolidation, highlighting the importancc of procedural elements like party system, 
elite fonnation or interest groups. These different functional representations of interest 
constitute formal or informal actors in the political system and they determine how the 
norms and structures of the consolidation process at the first level are to be completed. 
to the type and method of legislative recruitment under Thus, this topic refers 
:l Merkel, W. 1998. The Consolidation of Post-Autocratic Democracies: A Multi-level Model. 
Democratization, 
Ibid" p. 43. 
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2 
democratic procedures, while the transition from first to second level is diffuse due 
to the fact that institutional change influences and detennines the setup of the second 
level '8 configuration. Moreover, representative consolidation will not come to an 
end with the democratic consolidation because it seems to be a much process 
in the context of those countries' integration into supranational organizations like 
the European Union. In addition, this level of consolidation is negatively correlated 
with the degree of political, social, and economic fragmentation and economic 
backwardness. Fragmented systems tend to perform a slower consolidation, because 
low professionalized political (often former communist) elites try to preserve their 
in the party system. But, as Merkel states, parties alone "cannot guarantee 
the intermediation of interests between state and society. The territorial representation 
must be eomplemented by the functional representation of organized interests. 
It is exactly this level of intermediary structures, however, that is chronically 
underdeveloped in post-authoritarian societies."s Even more, in former communist 
societies and countries, where the political elites are to a large extent identical with 
the economic elites, the representative consolidation should address the network­
in the economic sphere, too. Since there was in Eastern no influential 
domestic class of private proprietors or an economic elite that was independent from 
party-politics, the level of the representative consolidation should additionally cover 
the emergence of representative economic interest groups and their positioning in 
the political system and the society. Now, more than twenty years after thc beginning 
of the democratic consolidation, a considerably large part of the former 
communist, and state- and party-oriented elite has changed allegiance and nowadays 
represent the spearhead of an economic, private, and profit-oriented class." In terms of 
representative consolidation this level of democratic consolidation has to be extended 
into the stagc of supranational integration in order to cover structural changes in the 
post-democratization era, too. But in the latter case the focus has to be set on the 
in democratic representation and the reproduction of elite groups within the 
political and economic system. A real representative and behavioral consolidation 
can only be achieved when this process of consolidation does not consolidate a 
elite, which is covering political and economic sphere at the same time and 
t:xl;lUuing other groups from access to economic possibilities, but imolements fair and 
transparent processes of selection, accession and elite alteration. 
5 Ibid., p. 53. 
6 Eyal, G., Szeienyi, I., & Townsley, E. (Eds.) 2000. Making LaDi/alis" Class 
Formation and Elites Struggles in Posl-Communist Central Europe. 
56 • East European Countries after the Breakup of Communism and the Ongoing Challenge of European Integration 
The behavior of the actors at the third level is affected by the link between the 
previous two levels. Merkel named this third level the behavioral consolidation and 
describes the emergence of possible veto players. "The stability of a political system 
depends greatly on whether the social and elites follow the constitutional 
rules and accept the legitimacy of the new democratic system. If the political leaders 
and powerful elites (military, capital, large landowners) do not perceive their own 
interests sufficiently protected, they will not accept the legitimacy of the new 
democratic system:,7 These examples match to the experiences made in Latin America 
and Southeast Asia, especially in South Korea, Thailand or the Philippines, where 
interventions post-autocratic behaviors. In Eastern Europe military, 
capital or large landowners no role as veto The most remarkable groups 
were the former communist elite and the elite that arose with their help, forming 
nowadays powerful economic actors like the oligarchs in Russia and Bulgaria. The 
barons in Romania and tycoons in Slovenia are the same phenomenon with different 
names and represent a lesser threat to the consolidation process than in Russia. Merkel 
discusses the degree of democratic consolidation in all East European countries.' 
At the same time it is insufficient to demand only acceptance of and adjustment to 
democratic rules and structures of these elites. Today we have empirical evidence 
that some of these East European elites as well as the populace consolidated their 
behavior to democratic norms, misusing them for their own purposes. For example, if 
the ruling parties have especially close relationships with managerial elites from the 
public sector, they have multiple mechanisms to convert their control into competitive 
advantages in the electoral and distributional process. 
The fourth and last level depends on the successfully implemented first three 
levels and is defined as the democratic consolidation of the political culture. This 
level describes the emergence of a citizenship culture and a civil society which 
has internalized democratic standards, values and procedures and the support 
for democracy. The implementation and strengthening of this level can last for 
generations, but it is crucial for a functioning and stable democracy. The legacies of 
the past are obvious, even if they should not be overestimated for the consolidation 
of the democratic system and institutional framework. The legacies are much more 
important for the way of establishing relations and socio-economic dependences in 
Merkel, W. Or.cit, p. 56. 
S Merkel, W. 2010. Plausible Theory, Unexpected Resnhs; The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central 
and Eastern Europe. In: Best, II., & Wenninger, A. (lids.), Landmark /989 Central and Eastern European 
Societies Twenty Year., after the System Chan"e (pp. 7-26). MUnster: LIT-Verlag. 
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the consolidated systems. Regardless of whether one draws on the concept of the 
determining communist legacy or the liberalization approach" for the transformation 
period itself, the influences of the legacies on the political culture and elites behavior 
is only partly shaped by the structure of constraints and incentives of the democratic 
and market oriented system. It is not based on an institutional and behavioral imitation 
of Western democratic standards, but rather an adaption of and an accommodation to 
the new rules embedding them into the countries' political culture. In this environment 
a type of c1ientelism effect can arise, that has through a defective political culture 
negative effects on the different stages of democratic consolidation and can lead to 
a dc-consolidation or even a roll back of democratic consolidation. "However, in 
the long run democracy needs for its consolidation the passive obedience and active 
support of the citizens, otherwise it runs the risk of degenerating into some sort of 
defective democracy where the executive hollows out important checks and balances 
of the democratic and constitutional political order."lo 
Eastern Europe's Integration and Beyond 
But what docs this mean for the EU-Integration of the East European countries? 
The transition to a democracy has not been carried out for solely systemic purposes, 
but from the very beginning it aimed at the countries' integration into the West­
European political and economic structures, the European Community and later the 
European Union. The European Community strongly supported the democratization 
of the East-European countries and initiated a gradual and asymmetric enlargement 
strategy. It backed the countries' political and administrative institutions in developing 
new democratic structures, introducing adequate internal procedures and a market 
economy in order to make them compliant with Community's setting. This was the 
precondition for accession negotiations, and the candidate countries were required to 
adopt the Union's acquis communautaire. This focused on the creation of a general 
institutional framework supporting the functioning of EU policies a, a prerequisite for 
enlargement and successful integration. In the theoretical model mentioned before the 
Crawford, B. & Lijphart, A. 1995. Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe: Old Legacies New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressure. Compara/ive Political 
Studies, 28(2), 171-199; Cirtautas, A. M. & Schimmelfennig, F. 20lU. Europeanisation Before and After 
Accession: Conditionality, Legacies and Compliance. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(3), 421·441. 
10 Merkel, W. Op.cit, p. 57. 
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so-called enlargement acquis applied to the first and second level, and partly to the 
third. Nevertheless, the simultaneous democratization and integration turned out to be 
conflicting logics, because "the principles and nonns that dominated enlargement-most 
notably inevitability, speed, efficiency, and expertise-constrained democratic politics 
in the applicant countries and limited their EU accession to a narrow sphere of elites 
and experts."I1 In this phase the European demand for compatible institution-building 
and transposition of EU regulations and norms often competed with the internal post­
communist elite's struggle for an institutional design complying with their own needs. 
While the constitutional consolidation had been completed early, the representative 
consolidation was partly finished, but continued to be in a state of flux. The stage of 
the behavioral consolidation created some powerful economic clites as veto powers, 
to monopolize political and economic activity. These influential groups of 

players, the above mentioned oligarchs, barons or tycoons can be found at local and 

central levels as well as on high-Ievel12 These actors, even if they were far from being 

influential like the Russian oligarchs, competed in institutional design especially in 

Bulgaria and Romania but in other Central Eastern European and Baltic countries, 

too. Many scholars expected with regard to economy that the transformation will 

fail because the old elites remaining in power will hang on to communist legacy 

and will thwart economic competition. I) But now, more than twenty years after 

the collapse of communism it is obvious, that many of the old elites took part in 
the transformation, be it as politicians, be it as new entrepreneurs. The dilemma of 
simultaneity of the transformations was soon complemented with the requirements 
of integration. All these partly concurrent, partly complementary demands led to 
relatively weak state institutions, especially in the two mentioned Balkan countries 
and thus to the emergence of powerful informal networks within the state as well 
as non-state networks. These networks took over some of the state's functions and 
built a system of exclusive networks with strong ties privileging the early winners 
l 
from the post-communist elites in the renegotiation of the new rules. .! These groups 
Raik, K. 2004. EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and integration as 
Conflicting Logics. East European Politics and Societies, 18(4),567.594. 
I ~ Bezlov, 1., & Gounev, P. 2012. Organised Crime, corruption and public bodies. In: Gounev, P., & 
Ruggiero, V. (Eds.). Corruption and Organized Crime in Europe: 1/Iegal partnerships. London, New York: 
Routledge, 32-54. 
:3 Sznajder Lee, A. 2011. After the Palty, the After-Parties" The Eflects of Communist Successor Parties on 
Economic Refoml in Central and Eastern Europe. Europe Asia Studies. 63(9), 1697-1718. 
I ~ Dimitrova, A L. 20 I O. The New Member States of the EU in the Aftcnnath of Enlargement: Do New 
European Rules Remain Empty Shells? Journal o(Eumpean Public Polrcv, (17)1, 137-148. 
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could benefit from the opportunities provided by the privatization of state enterprises 
They even managed to transfer their influential position into the democratic and free 
market system by using their extensive internal knowledge and network ties. Leaving 
dead weight behind them, they built up a strictly market and profit­
oriented pressure or even veto group, influencing European integration as well as the 
socio-economic consolidation of their countries. "However, it does not require a great 
leap of the imagination to assume that networks which have come together to take 
advantage of state assets would attempt subsequently to capture the distribution of EU 
funds. Institutionalization of the rules promoted by the EU has the potential to become 
the next arena for contestation for post-communist entrepreneurs, especially when the 
institutions involved have distributive implications.,,15 
In the pre-accession stage the Union encouraged and supported democratization 
and compliance with European standards in the East European countries and had a 
significant impact in the policy dimension. "Most studies confirm that this impact is 
due to the EU's conditionality and that the incentive of membership [ ... J also 
domestic eosts"I" This was done to support the strategy of transferring formal rules 
into the countries' set of rules and to institutionalize them. But these rules were mainly 
institutional rules and, as Hammond and Butler concluded, "considering institutional 
rules alone provides an inadequate guide to the behavior of any system. Instead, the 
changes in the preference profile are a critical element of the story about the influence 
of institutions on policy change.',17 In transition countries this preference 
depends on the behavioral consolidation, the consolidation of the political culture and 
how the new rulcs are institutionalized. In this process formal rules are supported by 
informal rules and informal rules emerge from a daily application of formal rules. 
Here we find that institutionalization depends on the cooperation of administrations 
and political elites, because if formal and informal rules do not align, it is impossible 
that a real institutionalization comes into being. l & Institutionalization alone provides 
the key de jure foundations of governance compatible with EU-standards, but does 
Ibili., p. 144 
1 B Sedclmcier, 1I. 2006. Europcanisation in new member and candidate states. Living Reviews in European 
Governance, 1(3).3-34; Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeicr, U. 2005. The Europeanization a/Central and 
Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press; Sedelmeier. 1I. 2012. Is Europeanisation through 
Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-m of Institutional Change after Ell Accession. West European Politics. 
35( I), 20-38. 
17 Hammond, T. H. & Butler, C. K. 2003. Some Complex Answers to the Simple Question' Do Institutions 
Matter?' Policy Choice and Policy Change in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems. Journal of Theoretical 
Polilies, 15(2), 145-200. 
I Dimitrova, A. L. 2010 op.cit., p.l44 
60 . East European Countries after the Breakup ofCommunism and the Ongoing Challenge of European Integration 
not lead automatically to structures and behaviors which ensure consolidation, 
integration and a persistent adaption to the behaviors of the EU. As for the Eastern 
and Central Europeans countries' pre-accession stage this means that in cases where 
the incentive of membership has been the only motivation for a transposition of rules 
the consolidation process remained vulnerable for a potential backsliding. Or, the 
nom1S and structures remained only empty shells after transposition which has in fact 
been the case much more frequently. The adopted formal rules remained rules-on­
the-books rather than rules-in-use and did not affect the behavior of the actors. And 
this has negative implications for the third level, the behavioral consolidation. In a 
worst-case-scenario that is, if the structural adaption is conditionality-induced 
governments can reverse inconvenient institutional changes and political or legal 
norms after accession. Here the consolidation process faces an external short-term 
incentive that can be replaced after accession, if veto groups are strong enough or 
don't adapt to new structures. The extreme position of a major backsliding cannot be 
observed in the East European countries, as many scholars found OUt. 19 Nevertheless, 
we have empirical evidence for at least a partial backsliding after accession and 
fulfilled conditionality. One example is the civil service sector, where cases of reform 
backsliding after integration in the Union are well known. They can be observed in 
Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Hungary combined elements 
of reform continuation and reform backsliding 20 Other examples, referring to the 
first and second level of the consolidation model, concern systemic re-adjustments 
or violations of national and/or European laws. This can be observed in Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia especially in the field of minority protection. For 
example, over the last years the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index 
analyzed the situation of national, religious and ethnic minorities, too, and observed 
partial backsliding.21 Recently Hungary came on the watch list, when the Hungarian 
parliament passed a new constitution and several laws as for instance a new media 
19 Sede1meier, 1I. 2012. Op. cit. ; Pctcrsheim, M.-J. 2012 "The Euwpean Union and Consolidating 
Democracy in Central and Eastern . Journal of European Integration, 34( I). 75-91. ; Levitz, P. & 
Pop-Eleches, G. 2010. "Wby No The European Union's Impact on Democracy and Governance 
Before and After Accession". Comparative Political Studies, 43(4), 457-485. 
Mayer-Sahling, J.-H. 2011. "The Durability of Et! Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
atier Accession". Governance. An International Journal ofPolicv. Administralion, and institutions, 24(2), 231­
260. 
! I Schwellnlls. G., Balazs. t, & Mikalayeva L. 2009. "It ain't over when it's over; The adoplion and 
slIstainability of minority protection rules in new Ell member states". In; Frank Schimmelfennig 1'. & Trauner 
F. {Eds). ~<P(}s(~accessi()n compliance in the EU's new member slates, European Integration online Papers 
(EloP) ", 13(2), Art. 24, http;lleiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-024a.htm. 
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law or the reorganization of electoral districts. The Hungarian government has been 
accused of disabling democratic mechanisms which would lead to the country's 
multiple disintegration. Another example is the Romanian case, where the government 
restricted unlawfully the independence of constitutional court and attacked the 
judiciary in 2012. These are attempts to partially readjust the political system, which 
can be necessary due to changing environment in some cases whereas in other cases it 
means a step towards European disintegration. 
Where the influence of democratic institutions on policy and bchavioral change 
is too small, the incentive of partial disintegration can be high for some elites. This 
~li.aIIlpl~ for another meaning of 
actor by institutional 
to a self-integrated society. 
'''5~UUVU into the 
Latvian, Slovakian or Romanian into a ""Mn~~rt 
is a European integration does 
not Union as an international 
also has an internal denomination leading 
mtpor<thnn of oolarized societies like the Hungarian, 
needs a lot of special efforts 
to be completed. Therefore, this kind of constructivism focuses 
llll~lt:aulllg, because it level, the legal and institutional lOUIlIJJlHlIllO and is 
does not address production and reproduction of social practice, social action and the 
complexity of power concentration especially in the former communist countries. 
As mentioned before, accession-conditionality can lead to transposition of rules or 
laws into empty shells, existing simply on paper. Even if most transpositions led to 
accepted rules and rules-in-use, some permutations of European rules partly simulated 
compliance and compatibility. Here, the political actors transposed the requested 
European standards to accomplish membership in the EU, but ignored them in real 
life using parallel informal rules instead. This method clearly hampers further post­
accession integration, goes on the account of veto actors and is related to rules and 
institutions which have distributive implications22 This aspect brings up another key 
regarding the post-accession compliance and ongoing integration not only in 
Eurooean structures and administration, but and primarily - in a societal integration 
and a behavioral adaptation to European standards on all political and administrative 
levels. While we can observe top elites' democratic, urbanized, biased and 
prestigious behavior, mid- and low-level administration still suffers from the existence 
of exclusionary nf>twnrh 
r-Arrllnt1nn and crime are the 
I}lUUlt:Ill areas. Thus, after the first Eastern 
Dimitrova, A. L. 2010 (}p.cil. 
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in 2004, the Union's integration strategy considered the problems of 
pre-accession conformity, post-accession transposition and possible backsliding or 
insignificance of European rules. As an outcome, the European Union established the 
so called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.23 This mechanism monitors those 
problematic policy areas which arc seen as an obstacle for a successful intpur!ltiM 
The decision of the EU's commission defines as scope of Romania's 
progress: 
"( I) Ensure a more transparent, and efficient JudICIal process 
by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal 
procedures codes. 
(2) Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for 
verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for 
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be 
taken. 
(3) Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non­
investigations into allegations of high- level corruption. 
Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular 
within the local govemment.,,24 
Concerning 
addition the 
the and Verification Mechanism contains In 
is a serious 
constraining effective integration and enforcement of standards on all 
political, administrative and social levels. By admitting and Romania in 
2007 and establishing the above mentioned mechanism, the Union 
Eastern Europe's multi-speed integration on the one hand and an obstructed integration 
of Europe on the other hand as well. All those monitored problems are the direct 
outcome of the incomplete democratic consolidation, the powerful informal networks 
and veto-players and the unfavorable integration conditionality conducted by the EU. 
2:1 Vachudova, M. A. & Spendzharova, A. 2012. "The EU's Cooperation and Verification Mechanism: 
Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession. Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (Ed.)". European Policv Ana(vsis. March (I). 1-18. 
C(20()6)6569. Commission decision of 13/XII!2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of orogress in Romania to ~lddress specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight 
Commission (Ed.). Bruxelles. 
C(2006)6570. Commission decision of 13!XJI!2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of prol,'fcss in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas ofjudicial reform and the fight 
against corruption and organised crime. European Commissi(}n (Ed.). Bruxelles. 
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While the first Eastem enlargement widely relied upon the incentive of membership as 
a guiding principle, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria the motivation for adaptation 
to EU-standards was purged early after, because some Westem politicians promised 
membership before the countries reached the necessary integration level. 
There are some areas of policy, behavior and economy affected, but the 
sometimes vast corruption and the weak or even missing will to fight it together 
with problematic judicial practice are the most severe obstnlctions to the integration 
progress. The Union's Commission declared regarding the Romanian case in 
January 2013: "One of the major concems over the summer was the elear evidence 
of pressure on judicial institutions and lack of respect for the independence of 
the judiciary. This remains a major source of concern. The Commission received 
numerous reports of intimidation or harassment against individuals working in key 
judicial and anti-corruption institutions, including personal threats against judges and 
their families, and media campaigns to harassment. Unfortunately, the 
Commission's recommendation has not been fully implemented. Politically motivated 
attacks on the judiciary have not ended. A critical point is the acceptance of judicial 
decisions: this requires the whole of the political class to form a consensus to refrain 
from discrediting judicial decisions, undermining the credibility of magistra 
or putting pressure on them.""6 These judicial weaknesses are partly structural, 
since the Romanian legal system has features which make it vulnerable to abuse. 
The Commission's criticism sounds similar in the Bulgarian case, where it states: 
"Weaknesses in and investigative practice, in particular in relation to cases 
high-level corruption and serious organised crime, have been highlighted 
by the Commission since 2008.,,27 These examples show how the integration 
is restrained by incomplete democratic and behavioral c'onsolidation enabling some 
elites and veto players to pursue their own interests and to act as competitors towards 
administration's and state's goals. Achieving their countries' membership was essential 
for those networks, because membership guaranteed access to distributive institutions 
allowing them to participate in the consumption of EU-funds. A deeper integration and 
Europeanization is not their first choice, because this would mean a limitation to their 
access to power and economic distribution. 
This combination of relatively weak administration, powerful elite networks 
:W COM(20 13} 47. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: On Progress 
in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism. European Commission (Ed.). Bruxelles. 
COM(2012} 411. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: On Progress 
in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism. European Commission (Ed.). Bruxelles. 
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with direct access to state funds facilitates corruption on all political levels and in ali 
societal spheres. Of course, corruption is not only an East European phenomenon, and 
we can find corruption on different levels and different dimensions in all countries 
of the European Union. There are different measurement tools available that inform 
about corruption, corruption perception or control of corruption. Examples are the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the Bribe Payers Index, 
the Open Budget Index, Financial Secrecy Index or the World Bank's Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, different aspects related with a country's democratic 
consolidation. All these tools give an insight into a country's or a society's 
susceptibility to corruption but not to its socio-political effects. The decisive topic 
that enables to tell apart cormption in Eastern Europe from the one in the Western 
hemisphere is its socio-political function. While in Western Europe corruption is 
based on social structures mostly and is primarily embedded in societal environment, 
in Eastern Europe seems to be predominantly an administrative and 
one affecting system stability and ability to perform. This substantially 
affects administrative capacity and workflow, efficiency of law enforcement and the 
improvement of business environment, as all published European Commission's 
monitoring reports clarify with regards to Romania and Bulgaria2 ' Moreover this 
undermines people's trust in political and administrative elites, and subsequently has 
a negative impact on the stability of the system and its ability for a deeper integration 
in the EU. In addition, the evident politicization of judiciary, parliament, civil service, 
law-enforcement bodies and such negatively impacts the consolidation of the political 
culture. This type of corruption combines interests at various socio-economic levels. 
Striking examples are the "buying electoral votes to elections, corrupting law­
enforcement bodies to escape prosecution, corrupting aimed at securing political 
protection over white collar and organised crime. Thus, controlling administrative 
corruption is not possible without curbing political corruption.,,29 One 
example of this high-level corruption is the case of the former Romanian Prime 
Minister Nastase, who was imprisoned in 2012. 
Ihid., ; COM(2013) 47. Op.cit. 
(,SD 2012. Corruption and Anti-corruption in Bulgaria (2011-2012). Ed. Center for the Study of 
Democracy. Policy Brief No. 35. June 2012. 
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Conclusion 
Partial and incomplete democratic consolidation in conjunction with a parallel roll­
out of European rules into countries with still inadequate levels of democracy and 
behaviors is not the best pre-condition for a fast, successful, and deeper integration. 
This general framework favors an institutionalized form of corruption and the then 
resulting corruption-orientated network-building endangers those countries' internal 
consolidation and European integration, too. Greece, that also has an obviously 
tendency towards corruption, is a good example for this kind of threat the European 
integration faces and which is induced by powerful networks connected with 
corruption. However, intensified reforms in socio-political and societal spheres are 
substantial for a deeper European integration and should be connected with some kind 
of integration incentive like the common currency and social 
The still incomplete integration of most East and Central European countries 
reason to the conclusion that in a multi-speed Europe these countries are still 
facing multiple dilemmas. On the one hand, political and economic transformation 
and transposition of rules and laws are more or less completed. On the other hand, 
the adaption of the societies and behaviors to those rules is still in progress, so that 
integration did not end but began with the countries' accession to the European 
Union. Integration is still going on and seems to be a long development. Thus, 
status in the world order is determined, inter alia, by its ability to constitute 
something like an integrated organism and not only a cooperating organization. 
Informal network, powerful veto players, weak administrations, vast corruption that 
is effective in socio-political sphere and is affecting administration, electoral and 
distributional structures are seriously endangering Europe's to react on internal 
and external challenges. If Europe's strategy of integration should be successful 
versus the Asian strategy of partial and target-oriented cooperation, the focus cannot 
be only on adoption of political and administrative structures and rules, but has to 
turn its attention on the quality of socio-political structures, behaviors and the rules­
in-use, and not only the rules-on-the-books. Otherwise the still open question of 
financial integration as the next and possibly most important and irrevocable step will 
fail in practice, even if all new member countries are obliged to join the European 
Monetary Union. Further, these considerations highlight the necessity of a convincing 
transformation, democratization and integration theory, covering not only political, 
economic and administrative scopes, but also social, behavioral, sociological, societal, 
and the informal spheres in order to facilitate the integration of heterogeneous 
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countries. The outcomes of the European integration process and the theoretical 
findings can also be a substantial experience for other regions cooperating and 
integrating in economic spheres and eventually in the political one. Europe's ability to 
overcome all these integration dilemmas and obstacles will be decisive in search for 
the best regional strategy. 
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Multilateral Cooperation and Regional Integration in East Asia: 
for cooperative integration or membership game?l 
Seong-WooYi 
Introduction 
Multilateral cooperation in international relations has become a diplomatic remark 
in East Asia, as much as the regional cooperation that suffered a certain level of 
uncertainty despite various efforts to establish an international regime. After the 
Cold War ended in 1991, expectations for multilateralism in East Asia has gradually 
increased in anticipation of regional security and prosperity. 
Contrary to expectations, the future of multilateral cooperation in East Asia is 
not positive for dynamic international relations among major actors such as the U.S., 
China, Russia, and Japan. As a member of the G2. China has challenged the regional 
US dominated East Asia order that has been the status quo since the end of World War 
challenging China, Japan underwent a long-term economic 
has to pursue two simultaneous policy 
goals economic recovery and eX]parlSIC)ll to seek a way to compensate for the 
national status in the region. Korea has "nnmnr1"t" role in the process of the 
establishment a new U.S. and China dominated 
II. Jaoan faces a comolicated situation due to domestic and international affairs. Facing 
Multilateral cooperation in international relations is regarded as a 
advanced institution since it is based on democratic rule among nation states such 
as equal representative rights contrary to the verdict of traditional realists. European 
states created the European Union that the East Asian states regard as an ideal 
institutional development and a model case. Multilateral cooperation in East Asia is a 
new challenge for regional peace and security that simply reflects the different policy 
goals for each participant, despite the shared vision for a multilateral regime on a 
superficial level. A multilateral regime in East Asia could be a shared effort for peace 
and orosoeritv in the region. 
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